

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 ERDE-00 ACDE-00 /088 W  
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P R 100935Z MAR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0888

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0095

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS ON MARCH 6, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: US REP AND US DEPREP HAD DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY ON MARCH 6 AT INITIATIVE OF SOVIETS. SOVIET REPS DID NOT INDICATE ANY NEW ELEMENTS IN THEIR POSITION. THE MAIN THEME OF KHLESTOV'S REMARKS WAS THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES WERE BEGINNING TO DOUBT SERIOUSNESS OF WESTERN MOTIVATION IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. KHLESTOV BEGAN BY REFERRING TO THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID, AS THE SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD IT, THERE HAD BEEN PRESSURE IN THE UNITED STATES TO DECREASE ITS FORCES IN EUROPE. THE WESTERN EUROPEANS HAD  
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NOT WANTED ANY US FORCE WITHDRAWALS AND PARTICULARLY NOT

UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS. THE IDEA HAD THEN EMERGED OF LINKING US WITHDRAWALS WITH SOVIET WITHDRAWALS AND NEGOTIATING ON THIS BASIS. APPARENTLY, NONE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS HAD CONTEMPLATED REDUCING THEIR FORCES. PRIOR TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE EAST HAD INDICATED ITS INTEREST IN REDUCTIONS BY ALL. THEN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD STARTED. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD STRESSED THE NECESSITY FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS FROM THE BEGINNING. BUT TWO YEARS HAD PASSED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WERE STILL REFUSING TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS AS TO THEIR REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER, THE WEST CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO AN UNREALISTIC POSITION IN THAT IT TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE MILITARY FORCES IN THE AREA.

3. US REP SAID THAT, PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPER, THE WESTERN EUROPEANS HAD DECIDED TO MAKE REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE. HOWEVER, THE WESTERN EUROPEANS HAD HAD NO INTENTION ORIGINALLY TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS REGARDING THEIR FORCES IN CONNECTION WITH A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. WHEN THE EAST HAD EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS, THE ALLIES HAD DEPARTED FROM THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION AND STATED THEIR READINESS TO MAKE IMPORTANT COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING THEIR COMMITMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING IN THE SECOND PHASE AND THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE PHASES. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT COMMITMENT EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THAT ORIGINALLY INTENDED BY THE ALLIES TO COVER AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE FORM OF A PROPOSED NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT BETWEEN THE PHASES. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EAST HAD MERELY ADVANCED A FEW MINOR MODIFICATIONS OF ITS POSITION WHICH MERELY AMOUNTED TO A RESHUFFLING OF THE PROCEDURAL ELEMENTS.

4. US DEPREP SAID THE SOVIETS HAD THE KEY TO WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS IN THEIR WON POSSESSION. THE SOVIETS ENJOYED TWO LARGE ADVANTAGES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS: THE EAST HAD A LARGE GROUND FORCE SUPERIORITY IN THE

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AREA CONSISTING OF SOVIET FORCES AND, SECOND, THE SOVIETS WERE LOCATED ADJACENT TO THE AREA AND WOULD MERELY WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES. THUS, THEY WOULD NEITHER HAVE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES NOR LIMIT THEIR TOTAL SIZE. THERE WAS NO REASON FOR THE WEST TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WHICH PERMITTED THE SOVIET UNION FULL CONTINUED BENEFIT FROM BOTH OF THESE ADVANTAGES. THE ALLIES HAD SOLVED THEIR DEFENSE PROBLEMS UP TO NOW WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST AND THERE

WAS NO REASON FOR THEM TO ACCEPT ONE ENTAILING SUCH DISADVANTAGES.

5. KHESTOV SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE REFUSAL OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS TO MAKE ANY REAL COMMITMENT ON THEIR REDUCTIONS, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN USING UNSERIOUS ARGUMENTS ABOUT MUTUALITY AND GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES WHERE THEY ARBITRARILY CHOSE ONLY ONE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY. THE WEST WAS ASKING FOR SUBSTANTIAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS BUT THE 29,000-MAN US WITHDRAWAL IT OFFERED WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL IN COMPARISON WITH THE PROPOSED SOVIET WITHDRAWALS. THE ALLIES WERE CLAIMING THAT ONE COULD NOT CODIFY A DISPARITY IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WHEN AGREEMENTS WERE BEING SIGNED ALL THE TIME WHICH DID NOT AFFECT THE DIVERGING BASIC POSITIONS OF SIGNATORIES. THE SOVIET UNION AND MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT WERE NOT DEFEATED COUNTRIES; THEY DID NOT HAVE TO ACCEPT AN UNEQUITABLE AGREEMENT. THE WEST HAD ADVANCED AN UNREALISTIC POSITION FROM THE OUTSET AND HAD NOT CHANGED ITS ESSENTIALS.

6. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THIS, OFFICIALS IN EASTERN CAPITALS WERE BEGINNING TO WONDER ABOUT THE MOTIVATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THESE OFFICIALS HAD NOTED THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAD USED THE EXISTENCE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AS ARGUMENTS AGAINST THOSE IN THE US CONGRESS AND IN THE NETHERLANDS PARLIAMENT WHO WISHED TO REDUCE THE FORCES OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES, CLAIMING THAT FORCES COULD NOT BE REDUCED WHILE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED AND MAINTAINING FORCE LEVELS AS A CONSEQUENCE. EASTERN OFFICIALS HAD ALSO OBSERVED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEING USED AS A COVER FOR RESTRUCTURING OF US AND FRG FORCES IN THE FRG. CONNECTING THE LACK OF  
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SERIOUSNESS OF THE WESTERN POSITION WITH THESE ACTIONS, OFFICIALS IN EASTERN CAPITALS WERE WONDERING ABOUT THE REAL WESTERN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

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IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0095

FROM US REP MBFR

7. US REP STRESSED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY COUNTRIES WITH TERRITORIES OR FORCES IN THE AREA AND THE LIMITED OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE SOVIETS, THE TOTAL SIZE OF WHOSE FORCES WOULD NOT BE DECREASED OR LIMITED AND WHICH WOULD ONLY BE ACCEPTING A LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF FORCES IT WOULD STATION IN THE AREA.

8. KHESTOV ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NO REAL DIFFERENCE OF OBLIGATIONS IN PRACTICE BECAUSE, IF THE WESTERN APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WERE ADOPTED, THERE WOULD BE NO CONTROLS OVER THE SIZE OF FEDERAL GERMAN FORCES IAS SUCH. THE GERMANS WOULD HAVE A CONTINUING CAPACITY TO INCREASE. THE GERMANS WERE UNDER WEU LIMITATIONS, BUT THIS COULD BE UNILATERALLY CHANGED BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE WESTERN EUROPEANS. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NETHERLANDS REDUCED ITS FORCES, THE  
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GERMANS COULD INCREASE THEIR FORCES UNDER THE WESTERN APPROACH. THE RESULT COULD BE ANANOMALOUS SITUATION WHERE THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE REDUCED THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA AND THE GERMANS WOULD HAVE INCREASED THEIRS.

9. US REP POINTED OUT THESE ARGUMENTS WERE NOT POLITICALLY REALISTIC. THE FRG AND ALL OTHERS HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WERE ONLY WILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE IN A SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATION ABOUT REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES. MOREOVER, THE WESTERN EUROPEANS CONTINUED TO REFUSE TO COMMIT THEMSELVES AS TO THE SIZE OF THEIR REDUCTIONS. THE WAY THINGS WERE GOING, IN THE FAMOUS SECOND PHASE, THE NETHERLANDS COULD TAKE 30,000 REDUCTIONS AND THE GERMANS WOULD REDUCE ONLY ONE HUNDRED MEN AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY INCREASE TO MAKE UP FOR THE NETHERLANDS REDUCTIONS. THE SOVIETS SAW NO REASON TO AGREE TO REDUCTIONS OF THEIR FORCES UNTIL THEY KNEW HOW MANY FORCES THE GERMANS WOULD REDUCE AND STAY REDUCED.

10. US REP POINTED OUT THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE ADVANCED IF THE EAST COULD GET DOWN TO A MORE BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH ON DATA. SMIRNOVSKY SAID WAST WOULD SPECIFY IN THE PROTOCOL THE UNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN AND THE NUMBERS OF MEN AND ARMAMENTS IN THE UNITS. FOR THE MOMENT, PERCENTAGE OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE SPECIFIC ENOUGH. THE WESTERN EUROPEANS SHOULD AT LEAST SPECIFY WHAT PERCENT OF THEIR FORCES THEY WERE WILLING TO REDUCE.

11. IN THE AD HOC GROUP MEETING ON MARCH 7, US REP ORALLY BRIEFED MEMBERS OF THE GROUP ON THIS EXCHANGE. RESOR

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## Message Attributes

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